Summary of the Conference on Italian Citizenship Law (29 May 2025)

Author: Abogado Guillermo Iso

The conference, held at the Italian Chamber of Deputies, at Palazzo Valdina, convened legal experts, politicians, and advocates to dissect and strongly condemn the recent changes to Italian citizenship law, specifically Decree-Law 36/2025, which was converted into Law 74/2025. The overwhelming consensus was that the new legislation is detrimental to Italians born and residing abroad, potentially unconstitutional, also in breach of European legislation and a significant step backward for the nation's relationship with its diaspora.

Opening Remarks and Political Context

Claudia Antonini (Vice President, Associazione Nati Italiani) opened the conference by extending a warm welcome and profound gratitude for the hospitality of the Chamber of Deputies, which she referred to as "the highest seat of Italian Democracy, the home of all." She specifically thanked her colleague Fabio Porta and Avvocato Marco Mellone and warmly greeted the association's members and, most importantly, "the very reason for our existence: Italian women and men born and residing abroad who are following us live."

Antonini passionately declared that the presence of the attendees was due to Italy, their homeland, having "with a decree-law adopted by a coalition representing 20% of those entitled to vote, decided to slam the door in the face of belonging." She emphasized the historical context, stating the law "decided to sever a centuries-old bond built with the sweat, courage, and sacrifices of generations of immigrants."

Even more critically, she asserted that it "decided to cut off the future of new generations born in Italy," limiting freedom of movement and reducing citizenship transmission. Antonini highlighted the negative media portrayal of Italians abroad, which she described as "distorting the truth and pitting brother against brother with false accusations."

She pledged that "Nati Italiani" would "give voice, give visibility, give dignity to Italians born abroad" because "no parliamentary majority can erase our history, our values, our identity." She ended with a powerful declaration: "We are not oriundi, we are not Italo-descendants, we are not descendants, we are Italians. I refuse, I no longer want to hear that word. We were born abroad, but we are Italians, native Italians, and so we shall remain, despite any decree."

Fabio Porta (Member of Parliament), Porta recounted his previous political and administrative experience in the province of Modena, noting that Emilia Romagna, like many Italian regions, has "several thousand emigrants on all continents." He personally mentioned having "some relatives in the United States, in New Jersey," to whom he is "always very, very attached."

Porta stressed the strategic importance of Italian communities abroad, asserting they have always been "a driving force for investments, tourism, cultural and economic relations, as well as social." He argued that "limiting citizenship means weakening this strategic and structural bond and reducing Italy's capacity to valorize" this resource. He specifically mentioned that he would "again raise the issue" in parliament to amend the current law, which now requires exclusive Italian citizenship for an ancestor (a "possibility to re-acquire citizenship for Italian immigrants who had lost it for work reasons," which he deemed "largely inadequate").

He criticized the new law for creating "Serie A" and "Serie B" Italians, differentiating between those born in Italy with single citizenship and those born abroad with dual citizenship, which he saw as a "value added" until recently. Porta found it ironic that this law comes at the end of the "Year of Italian Roots," which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs promoted. He pledged that "we will not surrender" because this measure "strikes at the heart of Italians worldwide" and is contested by "friendly countries" who see Italy's attitude as "hostile." He also highlighted the government's timing, passing the decree before the Constitutional Court's scheduled ruling on June 24 on a "delicate issue," implying a lack of institutional etiquette. He mentioned suspicions, citing the Financial Times, of "international influences, particularly from one country, the United States," which, if true, would be "even more serious" and an "attack on our sovereignty."

Cristian Di Sanzo (Member of Parliament) emphasized the "important battle" fought with "colleague Fabio Porta, Tony Ricciardi, and Nicola Carè of the Democratic Party" to coordinate efforts against the decree. He extended thanks to Stefano Vaccari for his support. Di Sanzo asserted that the decree's impact extends beyond overseas communities, affecting Italy itself. He stated that "breaking this link between Italy and its communities abroad" in a country with Italy's history of emigration has "consequences both on Italy's soft power and on the role of Italians abroad," which will be "significantly diminished."

He called the decree a "true violence," unexpected and implemented abruptly via decree-law, limiting parliamentary debate. He lamented that despite collaborative efforts to propose "improving amendments" (e.g., allowing those registered in AIRE to continue transmitting citizenship), the final decree worsened the initial version by "blocking the transmission of citizenship after the first generation," meaning "those who emigrate abroad today will not have Italian grandchildren."

He deemed this "unprecedented," turning Italy's previously permissive citizenship law into "one of the most restrictive in the world," even more so than Germany, France, or Spain, resembling that of the UK or US, which are not countries of emigration. Di Sanzo stressed that Italy's international weight comes from its communities abroad, citing successful Italo-Americans and Italo-Canadians. He mentioned further forthcoming legislative changes, including a bill that "further restricts criteria for spouses," and pledged continued commitment to "never abandon our communities abroad."

Marco Mellone (Avvocato and Organizer of this Conference ), He explained the event's origin as a "necessary legal in-depth analysis" of Italian citizenship. He stated that the ius sanguinis principle has existed for "160 years," essentially since the Italian state itself, and is now "under attack."

He referenced José Saramago's The History of the Siege of Lisbon, where a proofreader changes one word to alter the entire story. Mellone asserted that the Italian legislator has done exactly this, "pretending to go back in time and pretending to touch rights that, as we know, have already been subject to regulations." However, he expressed confidence, echoing Claudia Antonini, that "before executive power, before legislative power comes the Constitution, general principles, international law," and that "we live in a state of law where there are organs and institutions," such as the Constitutional Court.

He reminded the audience of President Mattarella's recent statement that "no power in Italy is immune from controls and limits." Mellone highlighted the upcoming June 24 Constitutional Court decision, which will address the "same underlying philosophy that moved the legislator on this occasion: the concept that those born abroad, those who live abroad, are substantially a priori non-citizens, non-effective citizens." He concluded by calling the current situation an "opportunity for in-depth analysis, for uniting forces, and for clarifying this matter."

Additionally he mentioned that this law cannot be approached superficially, as it has been, nor read solely in bureaucratic terms, because it has profound implications on a constitutional, identity, social, and European level.

Academic Insights and Legal Analysis

Professor Nicola Brutti (Associate Professor of Comparative Private Law, University of Padua) delivered a presentation titled "Ius Sanguinis Citizenship Reform: Critical and Comparative Law Remarks." 

He observed that the ius sanguinis principle has seen "progressive application expansion" in Italy, not due to a "coherent normative strategy" but a "disorganized set of jurisprudential, technological, and cultural factors." This expansion was driven by Constitutional Court rulings that eliminated gender discrimination and the principle of single citizenship. On the other hand, it was fueled by the growing accessibility of genealogical data, made possible by digital tools, and by the emergence of a demand for identity and affection from entire communities of Italians born abroad, often located outside national borders.

The 1912 legislation reflected a historical context where Italian mass emigration was still a vibrant and painfully present phenomenon. The recognition of citizenship for the children of emigrants emerged as a symbol of continuity with the nation beyond its borders, albeit flawed by a still strongly patriarchal approach that, for example, denied women the power to transmit citizenship, and by a normative framework that penalized the voluntary acquisition of a second citizenship. But this was 1912. The long legislative silence saw no structural intervention until Law No. 91 of 1992, which left the field open to a series of Constitutional Court rulings, notably those that recognized the gender discrimination inherent in the previous provisions. 

He highlighted that the 1912 law reflected mass emigration, but the long legislative silence was broken only by the 1992 law, leaving a vacuum filled by Constitutional Court decisions (e.g., the 2009 Cassation ruling recognizing citizenship through the maternal line pre-Constitution).  Subsequently, with the notable Cassation Court ruling 446 of 2009, it was confirmed that even children born to an Italian mother before the Constitution came into force have the right to Italian citizenship, thereby removing a systemic obstacle that had historically excluded a large portion of descendants. 

As said before, in recent years there has been a significant increase in requests for recognition from foreign citizens of Italian origin. This is due to a series of contributing factors, including, in the 1970s and 80s, the already noted and essential jurisprudential opening to ius sanguinis citizenship through the female line. The protection of the status of Italian women citizens who later married foreigners, and finally Law 91-1992, brought about the formal recognition and protection of dual citizenship.

One other factor not less important was the development of the internet and digital registries, in the face of this intensifying phenomenon, made it reasonable to expect the introduction of new criteria and thus a reform – specifically, requirements for an effective link or "genuine link," as later emerged from relevant jurisprudence he was referring to. Various European legislators, including those in France and Germany, while maintaining the principle of ius sanguinis, had long since placed limits on it, whereas in Italy, the issue was underestimated for too long, without being addressed at all.

This new  legislative intervention, Decree-Law 36/2025 (Law 74/2025) justified by the government with aims of reorganization and rationalization, introduces for the first time an explicit generational limit on the automatic transmission of Jure Sanguinis citizenship. It sets forth more stringent conditions and, more seriously, these are retroactive compared to the previous legal framework. 

The core of the reform is Article 1, paragraph 1 bis of the conversion law, which stipulates that Italian citizenship by descent can be recognized only if the parent or grandparent from whom it is derived possessed exclusively Italian citizenship at the moment of their descendant's birth.

This is, ironically, a sort of certificate of non-excessive dilution of Italian blood, a criterion distinctly different from that contained in the converted decree-law, which had provided for the ancestor's birth on Italian soil. What the place of birth of an ancestor, a completely random circumstance, has to do with the famous "genuine link" of the descendant is not known. The exclusivity clause is a disruptive provision that affects ius sanguinis transmission in a way that radically expunges entire generations of descendants who, despite meeting formal criteria of civil and legal continuity, are now retroactively (meaning now for then) deprived of recognition.

In particular, it penalizes those who descend from Italians with dual citizenship, even if acquired automatically, as by ius soli. This approach seems specifically designed to target transnational realities. Many descendants of Italians abroad, for example in Brazil, Argentina, and previously Australia, have mixed citizenship by birth, without any active choice. Consequently, it discriminates against those without ancestors of exclusive Italian citizenship versus those who do, without any rational justification supporting this. As a partial mitigation of this effect, the norm provides an alternative derogation, subject to demonstrating that one of the applicant's parents resided in Italy for at least 2 years after acquiring citizenship and before the child's birth.

However, this clause, in addition to being obviously retroactive itself, appears difficult to implement in practice for most descendants of historical migrant communities, whose ties to Italy have always been primarily cultural, emotional, and symbolic in nature, not necessarily reducible to continuous residency experiences.Further provisions introduced within the new normative framework further burden the procedure.

The new burden of proof on the interested party is confirmed in the conversion phase; they must now demonstrate the non-existence of causes for non-acquisition or loss of citizenship by their ancestors. The rights of minors are restricted, subordinating recognition to a combination of conditions related to the parent's residence and the application date.A special regime for work permits is introduced for Italians born abroad, who are no longer considered citizens. This represents a true downgrading of a perfected subjective right into a mere expectation subject to a discretionary and selective regime.The retroactive scope of the new provisions is particularly controversial.

The legislator has, in fact, established that the new conditions apply to all those who had not submitted a formal citizenship application by March 27, 2025, the date the decree-law came into force. No transitional window or safeguard clause was provided for individuals who, despite possessing the requirements under the previous legislation, had not yet initiated the relevant procedure for reasons not attributable to their own will. This normative framework, with its combination of formal rigor, retroactive effects, and onerous burden of proof, raises numerous critical issues regarding its compatibility with the fundamental principles of our Constitution.

One of the most problematic points lies in the substantive retroactivity of the conditions for citizenship recognition. The application of requirements introduced by the legislator even to individuals already born who, under the law in force until March 27, 2025, were holders of Italian Jure Sanguinis citizenship, creates clear tension with the principle of non-retroactivity of laws that negatively affect acquired rights.

This principle is implicitly protected by Article 3 of the Constitution, in conjunction with Articles 2 and 22, as well as by Article 11 of the preliminary provisions of the civil code, and has been recognized by the Constitutional Court on multiple occasions. Iure sanguinis citizenship is, in fact, original and not concessional. It was already transmitted by direct effect of the law, not requiring any act of attribution by the State. In this sense, jurisprudence has clarified that the administrative procedure has a merely declaratory and not constitutive value.

The Cassation Court, in ruling 25317 of 2022, stated that depriving a person ex post of the right to recognition solely for not having yet formalized it administratively is equivalent to an implicit revocation of a subjective right already arisen in the absence of previously determined causes for forfeiture.

Article 22 of the Italian Constitution establishes that no one can be deprived of citizenship for political reasons. Doctrine and jurisprudence have recognized in this a general principle of protection of status civitatis, whose loss must only occur in the presence of substantial and procedural guarantees. The effect of the reform, which is to deprive of citizenship individuals who held it ab origine based on requirements introduced subsequently and not attributable to individual behavior, risks taking on the characteristics of a punitive forfeiture, in contrast with the guarantor framework of Article 22.

The Constitutional Court has repeatedly affirmed that the legislator, while being able to modify the discipline of subjective rights and personal statuses, is obliged to protect the legitimate expectation of citizens in the stability of the normative framework, especially where they have based legally and humanly relevant choices on it. The absence of a transitional period or a safeguard clause for those who held already consolidated or in-definition subjective situations represents a serious violation of the principle of legitimate expectation. The provision of exclusive safeguarding for applications already submitted by March 27, 2025, moreover in a context where access times to Italian consulates can exceed years, introduces a clearly unreasonable and arbitrary criterion.

The introduction of a discriminatory principle based on the ancestor's exclusive possession of citizenship generates a mechanism that penalizes those who, due to migratory processes or local naturalization laws, acquired a second citizenship. In this way, a disparity is created between descendants of Italian citizens with single citizenship and those with dual citizenship, a condition that, it must be reiterated, does not in itself reflect any real difference in connection with the national community. Furthermore, the provision concerning facilitated work permits aimed at Italo-descendants excluded from citizenship constitutes an additional discriminatory norm that reduces a constitutionally protected status—citizenship—to a discretionary and sectoral administrative concession.

Comparing Italy to other European systems, Brutti noted that Germany (1999 law) set a generational limit but with a programmed, non-punitive approach and safeguards (e.g., applying within one year of birth). France (1993 Law, 30-3 Civil Code) allows for loss of citizenship after 50 years without significant contact, but with a "reaction faculty" for citizens to declare their commitment. The Netherlands (2019 Tiebes case) had automatic loss after 10 years abroad but required "individual and proportionate evaluation of effects."

Brutti concluded that all these systems were "predictable, non-retroactive, and tempered by safeguard clauses," making Italy's 2025 reform "singular, anomalous," and based on "hostility towards dual citizenship," which is "alien to Italian, European, and international legal tradition." He predicted "future litigations," including before the European Court of Human Rights (citing Genovese v. Malta 2011) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (citing Tiebes and Rottman). He ended by lamenting that the legislative process seemed like a "poker game," "bluffing and then raising," and creating a "moral hazard" by offloading the burden onto affected individuals and the Constitutional Court.

Prof. Avv Giovanni Bonatto (Associate Professor of Procedural Law and Comparative Legal Systems, University of Paris-Nanterre) elaborated on "The Citizenship Reform and the Issue of Bipolide."

He affirmed that the decree "goes in the opposite direction to the centuries-old Italian legal tradition" by introducing "stringent rules of immediate and retroactive application." He explained that it effectively considers those born abroad with another citizenship as "no longer Italian citizens" by retroactively changing the requirements for ius sanguinis. He listed the few exceptions, such as those who applied by midnight on March 27, 2025.

Bonatto stated that the decree exhibits "innumerable profiles of constitutional objectionability and incompatibility with European law," including the "lack of prerequisites for decree-law issuance" (given that the issue was not urgent but long-standing) and "violation of the principle of retroactivity and legitimate expectation." He called it a "mass disinheritance," a "tombstone preclusion," and a "guillotine" that extinguishes existing rights. He reiterated that Italian citizenship is "permanent," "essential," "original," and "imprescriptible," acquired at birth based on the law then in force, citing Article 20 of the 1992 law and similar French law (Article 172). He emphasized the historical precedence of ius sanguinis since the Napoleonic Code. Bonatto differentiated between "substantial entitlement" (belonging by blood) and "formal entitlement" (public recognition), arguing the decree attacks the former. He noted that while historical collective deprivations of citizenship occurred in totalitarian states (citing examples from France 1915, Soviet Union 1921/1925, Italy 1926, Nazi Germany 1935/1941, Czechoslovakia 1945, Saddam Hussein's Iraq), the Italian Constitutional Court has repeatedly declared automatic loss of citizenship unconstitutional. He cited the recent N.O. v. Denmark (2023) EU Court of Justice ruling, which stated that automatic loss is incompatible with proportionality if no individual examination of consequences is allowed.

Bonatto then detailed the decree's creation of "categories of individuals": "Serie A Italians" (formally recognized) vs. "Serie B Italians" (unrecognized, declassified to "foreigners of Italian descent"). He highlighted the "place of birth" as the new "watershed" and the possession of "one or more citizenships" as a disadvantage for dual citizens.

He argued that the decree's "critical design" aims for an Italian people "constituted by individuals born in Italy and who have only one citizenship." He found the law "incoherent and unreasonable" for incentivizing births in Italy to bypass restrictions and for its problematic treatment of minors (who, if born abroad, might acquire citizenship by "benefit of law" but not be able to transmit it). He strongly disagreed with the government's justification that it's a "non-acquisition" rather than a "loss," arguing it's a "retroactive and general loss." He warned of a "very dangerous precedent" for all Italians abroad, allowing the government to impose "new conditions that apply retroactively."

He criticized the requirement for an ancestor to have "exclusively" Italian citizenship, arguing it will lead to an unreasonable burden of proving negative citizenship for all other states. He concluded that the decree "discourages the integration of Italian citizens in foreign countries."

Professor Roberta Calvano (Full Professor of Constitutional Law, Unitelma Sapienza University of Rome) provided "Constitutional Profiles of the New Legislation on Citizenship by Blood Right." 

She reiterated that citizenship is a "cardinal point of the legal system" defining the people and democracy and intervening so abruptly is extremely delicate. She highlighted Article 22 of the Constitution, which prohibits deprivation of citizenship for political reasons, suggesting this could be a relevant argument. Calvano stressed that citizenship and electoral matters are "reserved to an assembly" (Article 72), meaning an ordinary legislative process is required, not a decree-law. She criticized the government's justification based on "alarming numbers" of consular and judicial backlogs, problems with referendum quorums, and concerns about EU passport "trafficking." She countered that these are decades-old issues, not "extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency" justifying a decree-law.

She dismissed the argument that the decree was to prevent a "rush to the counters" before an organic law, suggesting a temporary suspension would have sufficed. She also found it incredible that the Senate commission discussing the decree was unaware of the government's separate bill on citizenship. Calvano vehemently argued that the claim of non-retroactivity in the explanatory report is false: "The one who has already acquired the right to citizenship and only needs to access a declaration... the access to administrative or judicial ascertainment of citizenship is immediately retroactively affected."

She emphasized that ius sanguinis means citizenship is acquired at birth, so changing conditions retroactively impacts this. She pointed to concerns about "reasonableness and proportionality" and violations of Article 72 and limits on emergency decrees. She cited the Constitutional Court's past calls for an "organic revision" (achieved in 1992), which she now suggests might have been "too broad-ranging" given current issues.

However, she found the new law's drastic restrictions "unreasonable" and lacking a clear foundation, particularly the "exclusively" Italian citizenship requirement for ancestors and the "paradoxical situation" where someone applying an hour before the deadline might retain rights while another loses them. She mentioned the "faint" amendment allowing entry of Italo-descendant workers in derogation of quotas, seeing it as an insufficient attempt to link citizenship to demographic decline solutions. Calvano strongly affirmed "strong constitutional criticisms" of the new law, especially with its amendments. She advised activating legal challenges before civil judges, who could then refer cases to the Constitutional Court based on violations of Article 3 (unreasonableness, unequal treatment), Article 22 (surreptitious loss of citizenship), and legitimate expectation. She cautioned that there is no pending Constitutional Court case on the conversion law itself, only on the original 1992 law.

Professor Alfonso Celotto (Full Professor of Constitutional Law, Università Roma Tre) presented on “Italian Citizenship and the Constitution”.

He began by defining citizenship as an "ancient concept" that has evolved, highlighting its historical root in ius sanguinis as an "idea of great liberty" (belonging to parents, not a place or master). He stressed that citizenship is a "status" acquired at birth, and formal recognition is merely an "assessment," not a constitutive act. Celotto recognized Italy's dual reality as a country of emigration and immigration (where children born in Italy may not be citizens).

He sharply criticized the government's use of a decree-law to "sever citizenship for emigrants," particularly because it is "retroactive" and affects "in-progress situations." He firmly declared it "radically unconstitutional" because decree-laws require "emergency and unpredictability," neither of which applied to the long-standing issue of citizenship abroad.

He argued that a decree-law cannot dispose for the past, as the Constitutional Court has consistently held since 1975 that citizenship attribution is "an act of assessment," not a "constitutive act." He emphasized that "acquired rights, legitimate expectations, and reliance" must be protected. He sarcastically pointed out the "incredible paradox" of the "gap" on March 28th (between the decree's formal entry into force and the deadline), calling it a "Dantean limbo." Celotto lamented the Italian Parliament's tendency to be "tardy and Luddite" (misoneista), often leaving complex social issues (like divorce, abortion, same-sex marriage, double surnames) to be resolved by the Constitutional Court.

He urged the Parliament to be "realistic and reasonable" rather than relying on "prohibiting by law and that's it," which "creates judicial chaos." He concluded, in South American style, "nada mas."

Professor Michele Carducci (Full Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law, University of Salento) presented on "The Italian Immigrant, and Their Descendants in the Italian Constitution." 

He reiterated the unique constitutional recognition in Italy of freedom of emigration and protection for emigrant workers (Article 35), stemming from Italy's historical diaspora. Carducci characterized the new law as a "law-provision on the oriundi," an impression bolstered by "parliamentary work, debates, and public statements."

He observed that oriundi have been "stigmatized" as an "administrative problem" due to overloaded offices, or even a "constitutional public order danger," citing specific judicial orders (Bologna and Florence). He found it concerning that the law's narrative frames ius sanguinis as an "anachronism" because Italy is now a country of immigration, essentially turning the oriundi into a scapegoat. Carducci strongly criticized the law's Article 1 bis, which "significantly" labels its purpose as "provisions to favor the recovery of Italian roots of Italian citizens," calling it "a sort of excused impediment." He argued that the oriundo, "kicked out the door as no longer a citizen, re-enters through the window as an immigrant, a foreigner, an aspiring immigrant."

He described this as a "magician's trick" playing with a person's identity and personal condition. Carducci emphasized that according to a 1960 Constitutional Court ruling (Sentence No. 15), the oriundo is a "person," and their belonging to Italian descent is a "de facto situation that must simply be declared." He reiterated that the law "mortifies the condition of the oriundo," creating a new condition of "stranger aspiring immigrant," which he finds incompatible with constitutional principles, especially Article 35. He pointed out the ironic situation where some majority members lament votes from Argentinians, yet grant citizenship to the Argentinian President. He concluded that the law is "unconstitutional in its entirety" and that the legislator has "lost that reasonable wisdom."

Professor Giacomo Di Federico (Full Professor of European Union Law, University of Bologna) discussed "The Impact of European Union Law on the terms of Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship."

He began by highlighting that EU citizenship, derived from national citizenship, grants a "series of additional rights" including civil, political, and economic freedoms (Articles 9 TEU, 20-21 TFEU). He introduced the Malta 'Golden Passports' case (Commission v. Republic of Malta, April 29, 2025, Grand Chamber), explaining that Malta sold citizenship in exchange for investments, effectively granting EU citizenship and its associated freedoms without a genuine link. Di Federico noted that while the Court of Justice of the EU had previously affirmed its competence in cases of loss of citizenship (e.g., Tiebes on Dutch law), Commission v. Malta was the first time it ruled on the attribution of citizenship, specifically by naturalization. He noted that Advocate General Ćapeta had initially argued that member states retain full competence over citizenship attribution. However, the Court rejected this, issuing a judgment of "undoubted constitutional value" for the EU. Di Federico detailed the Court's reasoning: EU citizenship is based on "common values" (Article 2 TEU) and "mutual trust" among member states, representing "a principal concretization of solidarity" and part of "European identity."

The Court stated that EU citizenship is "the fundamental status" of citizens. It then concluded that the "transactional nature" of Malta's program was problematic because it "ignored the essential character of the relationship of solidarity and loyalty" between a state and its citizens, and "undermined mutual trust." The Court described Malta's practice as "commercialization" and incompatible with the principle of "sincere cooperation" (Article 4(3) TEU), obstructing the creation of a "border-free area."

Di Federico then critically analyzed the Court's reasoning, finding some aspects surprising or concerning: the Court's lack of clarity on how Malta's checks were insufficient, the undefined "intensity" of the required bond of solidarity and loyalty, and the unclear connection between continuous physical presence and this bond. He then considered the applicability of this precedent to Italy's ius sanguinis law. While acknowledging that EU Court judgments have erga omnes effects (establishing general legal rules), he argued that the Malta precedent might not be directly relevant to Italy's ius sanguinis (pre-reform) because Italy's system was about recognition, not naturalization, involved no transactional element, and was not accompanied by advertising campaigns promoting EU benefits.

He also differentiated the security concerns: "perhaps less so for subjects coming from other states such as the United States, Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil." He then addressed the compatibility of Law 74/2025 (the new reform) with EU law. He concluded that the new law, which effectively acts as a "generalized revocation" of citizenship, is difficultly compatible with the principle of proportionality derived from Tiebes and Rottman. These cases require an "individual examination of the proportionality of the negative consequences" of losing citizenship.

Di Federico suggested more proportionate solutions, such as safeguarding the rights of those born before the new regime, or implementing a transitional period with individual assessments of the "bond of solidarity and loyalty," potentially linked to a period of residence in Italy. He concluded that, ultimately, it will fall to the Court of Justice of the EU to decide if Italy's reform is proportionate, suggesting a prejudicial referral is highly likely.

Discussion and Calls for Action

The conference concluded with a brief Q&A, reiterating several key points:

• The speakers agreed that the March 28th gap in the law (where the effective deadline preceded the official publication) is a clear legal flaw.

• The discussion touched upon the political motivations behind the law. Attendees expressed frustration that long-standing bureaucratic obstacles were deliberately used to impede citizenship recognition, and that the new law continued this pattern, fueled by a biased media narrative. While acknowledging these political factors, the legal experts emphasized that, in a court of law, direct proof of "political reasons" for stripping citizenship (Article 22 of the Constitution) can be challenging to demonstrate based solely on administrative practice. However, they agreed that effective communication is crucial to raise public awareness and understanding of the issue, helping to counter the distorted narrative.

• Fabiola Leardini, representing 112,000 petition signatories, conveyed the "desperation" of many, including her own family, where some siblings are recognized Italians while others are "guillotined." The professors advised pursuing judicial challenges before Italian courts to raise constitutional questions and suggested exploring the possibility of an abrogative referendum. They also emphasized the power of public awareness campaigns and the need for associations to take public stances.

• A genealogist (unidentified) expressed concern that even if the law is declared unconstitutional, it might not fully revert to the prior state. He asked how a future, more organic law could incorporate a "genuine link" (e.g., language, temporary residency in ancestral towns) without creating new constitutional issues or discrimination. The professors acknowledged that these are complex questions for future legislative efforts, emphasizing that while the legislator can introduce such criteria for future acquisitions, the current law's retroactivity remains the most significant legal hurdle.

  
  

The conference concluded with a strong message from Claudia Antonini, who thanked all speakers and participants. She reiterated that the battle against this "decree of shame" has "just begun," fighting against an "unjust law, supported by a distorted and often subservient media narrative."

She stressed that "knowledge is the first step to resist, and we will resist," aiming to protect not only Italians abroad but also "the image and future of all Italy." She thanked the Chamber of Deputies for hosting and acknowledged the collective efforts of the "Nati Italiani" board, president, vice presidents, and staff. She concluded with a powerful affirmation: "Together we are stronger, and above all, together we will not be erased."

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